Two Hundred Years Ago Today by Sherry, Suzanna
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1988
Two Hundred Years Ago Today
Suzanna Sherry
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Suzanna Sherry, Two Hundred Years Ago Today, 6 Law and Inequality. 43 (1988)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/376
? ???? ?????
Citation: 6 Law & Ineq. 43 1988 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Tue Oct 23 12:56:24 2012
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0737-089X
"Two Hundred Years Ago Today"*
Suzanna Sherry**
Two hundred years ago today, on a cool clear afternoon in
Philadelphia, thirty-nine men put their signatures on the Constitu-
tion of the United States and began the process that would create a
nation of thirteen separate states. In introducing my remarks to-
day, Dean Stein has called this the birthday of the Constitution. I
am sure that when he invited me to speak he expected that I
would give the usual congratulations and platitudes and toasts that
are appropriate for birthdays and other celebrations, but I rarely
do what Dean Stein expects me to do. What I want to do instead is
something a little unusual: I do not want to celebrate the writing
of the Constitution two hundred years ago.
There is a tendency in the bicentennial year-and especially
this week-to idealize the events of 1787. We tend to presume that
the men who wrote the Constitution were near-perfect demigods,
who crafted a brilliant and internally consistent document from
their own insights. We assume that the Constitution represents
the consensus of opinion of those fifty-five men, and even of the
population at large in 1787. I want to debunk those myths. I want
to talk instead about the problems, about the mistakes, and about
the very different visions of government that were represented at
the Constitutional Convention.
In short, I want to suggest that the drafters of the Constitu-
tion stumbled and bungled their way in to the document whose or-
igins we are celebrating here today. That debunking process
leaves a problem, however. Once we've debunked the myth and
exposed lack of any solid foundation for the Constitution, we are
left with a puzzling question. Why has it worked for two hundred
years? If the framers were as inept and as wrongheaded as I am
going to suggest that they were, how did they create such an effec-
tive and long lasting document? That is the main question that I
want to answer today, and it is one of the most important ques-
* Speech given on September 17, 1987 at the University of Minnesota Law
School in honor of the 200th anniversary of the Constitution.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
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tions about the Constitution, because it is what links us to our
history.
I want to start with a little historical background to set the
stage for the Constitutional Convention. The American Revolu-
tion began in 1775 with the shots heard 'round the world, the bat-
tle of Lexington and Concord. Although the United States
officially declared its independence in 1776, it did not win indepen-
dence until the end of the war in 1783. Nevertheless, the individ-
ual states began creating their first united government while the
war was still going on.
In 1777 the newly created Continental Congress, in which all
the states were equally represented, drafted the Articles of Con-
federation. The Articles of Confederation were the first United
States constitution. They were adopted by the unanimous consent
of all thirteen states and took effect in 1781. This original constitu-
tion looked very unlike our present Constitution. The Articles
created an extremely loose confederation. The Articles them-
selves called the union merely a "firm league of friendship." Not
yet a nation, the United States under the Articles were instead
bound by a treaty. The national government-which consisted es-
sentially of the Continental Congress-had virtually no power. It
could not even tax the people or the states, and the only way it
could raise money was to "requisition" the states: to ask the states
for money. With no enforcement mechanism, this source of reve-
nue-raising was not particularly effective.
Despite these flaws the Articles worked reasonably well dur-
ing the war. There were, however, some problems. The well-
known terrible winter at Valley Forge was due not only to the
snow, which certainly contributed to the problem, but also to the
fact that Congress had simply run out of money for the war effort.
There was no money to purchase food, clothing or supplies for the
soldiers, and each state responded to requisition requests by accus-
ing the other states of failure to comply with similar requests. Ob-
viously, however, the Articles worked well enough during the
Revolution to allow the United States to win the war.
It was not until after the peace that the real flaws in the Ar-
ticles of Confederation became apparent. Congress still could not
raise money, and so it could not pay off the war debts, including
debts to both foreign countries and individuals. Congress could not
regulate commerce, and so the states started an economic war with
each other, competing for trade and imposing various kinds of pro-
tective tariffs. As a result of some of these economic problems,
there was a recession in 1785 and 1786.
[Vol. 6:43
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So in 1786, Congress called for a constitutional convention to
amend the Articles of Confederation. Twelve states sent dele-
gates-Rhode Island refused-and from May 25 to September 17,
1787, the convention sat in the State House in Philadelphia, where
the Declaration of Independence had been signed eleven years
before. These delegates produced not the amendments they were
requested to draft, but a wholly new Constitution.
We know a good deal about what went on in the convention.
James Madison, who was one of seven delegates from Virginia,
took detailed notes, which were published after his death.1 They
are a rich resource for historical research, and provide a fascinat-
ing glimpse of the different political perspectives of many of the
delegates.
I began by suggesting that we tend to idealize the men who
wrote the Constitution, and I must admit that our exaltation has
an impressive pedigree. Thomas Jefferson, who was then in Paris,
called the convention, "an assembly of demigods." 2 The French
Charge-D'Affaires said that "if all the delegates named for this
convention of Philadelphia are present, one will never have seen,
even in Europe, an assembly more respectable for the talents,
knowledge, disinterestedness and patriotism of those who compose
it.,,3
Who were these most "respectable" delegates? They were
fifty-five men from twelve states with different interests, different
political views, even different personal lifestyles. They were also
very unsure whether they would be successful in reaching an
agreement on a new constitution. As late as August 15, three-
quarters of the way through the summer, John Rutledge, a dele-
gate from South Carolina, "complained much of the tediousness of
the proceedings."4 The same day, Oliver Elsworth of Connecticut
also seemed to succumb to despair. "We grow more & more skep-
tical as we proceed," he said, "[i]f we do not decide soon, we shall
be unable to come to any decision."5
1. James Madison, Notes of Debates in The Federal Convention of 1787 (Ad-
rienne Koch ed. 1966). Many other editions of Madison's notes have been pub-
lished. The notes are also included in Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787 (1911). Citations in this essay to Madison therefore include the
date of the quoted remarks, to enable the reader to locate the quotation in any
edition.
2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug. 30, 1787), reprinted in
1 The Adams-Jefferson Letters 1.96 (Lester Capon ed. 1959).
3. Letter from M. Otto, French Charge D'Affaires to Comte de Montmorin,
French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Apr. 10, 1787), reprinted in Farrand,
supra note 1, at 15 (translation mine).
4. Madison, supra note 1, at 465 (Aug. 15).
5. Id.
1988]
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There was good reason for skepticism and despair. Again and
again, delegates kept threatening to leave, and to dissolve the con-
vention. The delegates from Virginia and Pennsylvania threatened
to leave if the states were given equal representation in the Sen-
ate. The delegates from Delaware and New Jersey threatened to
leave if the states were given proportional representation in the
House. At one point, the debates became so acrimonious that Gun-
ning Bedford of Delaware threatened more than withdrawal. He
said that if the large states were to confederate on principles unac-
ceptable to the small states, "the small ones will find some foreign
ally of more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand
and do them justice."6 Both the northern and the southern states
also threatened to withdraw more than once over questions of
slavery. New York's delegates did withdraw, leaving in early July
in disgust with the proceedings. Alexander Hamilton returned and
signed the document, but the other two delegates never came
back. In fact, of the fifty-five original delegates, only forty-two
were still present on September 17. These departures and threats
to depart illustrate how serious some of the disputes were.
So with all of these problems and all of these differences, and
with farms and businesses and families at home, what kept most of
those men in Philadelphia all through that summer? What kept
them there was the one thing that they had in common: a dedica-
tion to the Republican Experiment. Alexander Hamilton of New
York described their task as "decid[ing] for ever [sic] the fate of
Republican Government." 7 That may sound a little melodramatic
today, but consider the background against which they were work-
ing. All of the governments of Europe were monarchies of one
sort or another, but the United States, after rejecting the English
king, were determined not to create another monarchy. Instead,
they would create a republic, a government based on the people.
The delegates believed that there had never in history been a suc-
cessful republic: all had succumbed quickly to either a tyrant from
within or invasion from without. So in writing the Constitution
for a republic, the delegates were starting from scratch. They
knew, moreover, that the eyes of the world were upon them. That
is why Hamilton could cast their task in such momentous terms.
And it was that mission-that sense of creating a "new order for
the ages"-that kept them in Philadelphia through all the con-
flicts, all the doubts, and all the despair.
What is particularly interesting and unfamiliar to many mod-
6. Id. at 230 (June 30).
7. Id. at 196 (June 26).
[Vol. 6:43
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ern observers is why they were so concerned about the state of re-
publican government. Why did they think that the eleven year-old
American Republic was doomed? Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
spoke the sentiments of virtually all of the delegates when he said:
"[t]he evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The
people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patri-
ots.... He had he said been too republican heretofore: he was still
however republican, but had been taught by experience the danger
of the levilling [sic] spirit."8 His phrases-"the levilling spirit,"
"the excess of democracy," "too republican"-were code words.
They were common language of the time, representing mistrust of
the people and of the popularly elected legislatures in the states.
If you read through Madison's notes and also through the letters
of the men who were there, this mistrust of the people comes up
again and again. According to the delegates at the Constitutional
Convention, the people--on whom the republic was supposed to be
based-were selfish and ignorant and neither knew nor cared how
to run a government. Virtually all of the delegates adhered to this
anti-democratic belief, including James Madison, often identified
as the father of the Constitution. Madison, for example, advocated
an aristocratic Senate, in order, he said, to protect the people
against the "transient impressions into which they themselves
might be led." 9
The "transient impressions" to which he was referring in-
cluded specifically movements in some states for such things as
debtor relief, paper money, progressive taxation, and other popular
acts that were being considered and enacted in the various state
legislatures. For the men in Philadelphia the best known example
of the excesses of democracy was Rhode Island, also known as
Rogue Island. At the time that the convention was sitting in Phil-
adelphia, the Rhode Island legislature was considering an act that
would require complete redistribution of property every thirteen
years. From the standpoint of our modern democratic, egalitarian
world, some of these fears of the excesses of democracy seem at
least misplaced and possibly dangerous.
An examination of the source of their fears, however, may
prove illuminating. One explanation of the founders' elitism was
given by progressive historian Charles Beard in the early 1900s. He
suggested that this elitist and anti-populist strain was simply the
8. Id. at 39 (May 31).
9. Id. at 193 (June 26).
1988]
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delegates' economic self-interest showing.10 His thesis was that in
order to protect their own property, these fifty-five wealthy men
betrayed the spirit of the Revolution of 1776 and produced instead
a conservative counter-revolution. This Beardian interpretation of
the events of 1787 is still taught, and is still one of the most fre-
quent methods of debunking the myths and criticizing the framers
of the Constitution. Beard's analysis clearly underlies Justice Mar-
shall's criticism, of the framers as wealthy, land-holding, slave-
owning white males.ll I would suggest, however, that Beard was
wrong on both counts.
First, there was no contrasting spirit of 1776 to betray. Many
of the same people who led the Revolution of 1776 were active in
framing the Constitution in 1787. Moreover, most of the leaders of
1776-whether or not they were ultimately involved in drafting
the Constitution-were equally mistrustful of the common people.
John Randolph of Virginia said in 1774: "[w]hen I mention the
public, I mean to include only the rational part of it. The ignorant
vulgar are as unfit to judge of the modes, as they are unable to
manage the reins of government."12  Benjamin Rush of Penn-
sylvania, commenting in 1776 on the new Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion, said: "they call it a democracy-a mobocracy in my opinion
would be more proper. All our laws breathe the spirit of town
meetings and porter shops."1 3 Thus Beard's account of a populist
spirit of 1776 is, to say the least, somewhat exaggerated.
I have a second-and much more important--disagreement
with Beard. I do not believe that it was solely economic self-inter-
est that motivated the delegates in Philadelphia. Listen for exam-
ple to James Wilson of Pennsylvania on the floor of the
Convention on July 13th, 1787. Wilson was as anti-populist as any
of them, but he said: "[a]gain he could not agree that property was
the sole or the primary object of Govern[ment] & society. The cul-
tivation & improvement of the human mind was the most noble
object."14 Recall Gerry's description of the people: not that they
lack virtue, but simply that they are ignorant and likely to be
misled.
10. See Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States (1913).
11. Address by Justice Thurgood Marshall, Convention of the San Francisco
Patent and Trademark Law Association (May 6, 1987).
12. Quoted in Gordon Wood, The Democratization of Mind in the American
Revolution, in The Moral Foundations of the American Republic 109, 113-14 (Rob-
ert Horwitz ed. 1986).
13. Quoted in Samuel Harding, Party Struggles Over the First Pennsylvania
Constitution, in American Historical Association, 1894 Annual Report 386 (1895).
14. Madison, supra note 1, at 287 (July 13).
[Vol. 6:43
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The men in Philadelphia in 1787 were republicans, in the
sense that they wanted rule by the people rather than by a mon-
arch. They were not, however, democrats; they did not necessarily
believe in rule by the masses. They were instead aristocrats of a
sort, believing that although the government should be based on
and operated for the benefit of the people, only those fit to govern
ought to do so. That is certainly elitist, and quite different from
modern American sentiments, but it is not necessarily economi-
cally self-interested. The framers wanted an aristocratic govern-
ment not solely for their own good, but also for the good of the
country.
Still, they were all radically less egalitarian than we are to-
day. They didn't have much faith in the capacity of the masses to
participate in government, and they also disagreed about how to
remedy this inability of the masses: how ought they to create a
government based on the people when the people were not trust-
worthy? One of the primary reasons they could not agree on the
means for creating this new republican government was that they
did not agree on the ends of government. They did not all agree
on the most basic question: what are the purposes of a
government?
I will offer just two examples of the many different views of
the purposes of government that were present at the Convention.
Madison and his followers adhered essentially to John Locke's
classical liberalism. Specifically, they viewed governments as hav-
ing very limited purposes: government was, in their view, limited
to protecting selfish, vicious citizens from each other. Thus the
government was not supposed to become involved in individual
lives, nor to become involved with what individuals believed or
sought for their own aims, as long as those aims didn't interfere
with the lives and aims of others. For the Madisonian liberals,
then, the solution to the common people's lack of ability was sim-
ple; it was novel, and perhaps brilliant, but it was not very
complicated.
What Madison proposed was to take the self-interest of all
the various segments of society and oppose them against one an-
other. In this way ambition would counteract ambition, vice would
check vice, and the country would virtually run itself, like a well-
tuned machine. Madison's crucial contribution was to recognize
that where virtue is in short supply among the people, government
must instead be designed to run on vice. As one modern critic has
pointed out, the cost of Madison's solution is that it "magnif[ies]
and multipl[ies] in American life the selfish, the interested, the
1988]
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narrow, the vulgar, and the crassly economic. That is the substra-
tum on which [Madison] intended [our political system] to rest
"15
Madison's was not the only view of government at the con-
vention, however. James Wilson and others adhered to a form of
classical republicanism. Here I am using republicanism not just to
mean the antithesis of monarchy, but rather as the antithesis of
Madisonian liberalism. Wilson and other American republicans
saw an active government as the great educator: a government that
would pursue, in Wilson's words, "the cultivation & improvement
of the human mind,"16 and not just protect each from each; a gov-
ernment sustained by and sustaining of a virtuous people who
would put the good of the community ahead of their own selfish
interests; and a government involved with the mind and the spirit
and the ethics of a people. Wilson saw, in short, a government
whose purpose was to cultivate an unselfish, aspiring, virtuous peo-
ple. This type of government-which exercises a deliberative and
educative function-requires real people to make real value
choices; such choices cannot be made by an "invisible hand." Thus
what the republicans tried to accomplish was to ensure that the
legislators who would be making these choices would be wise and
just. This made these republican framers aristocrats of a sort.
They believed that only the educated elite, and not the uneducated
masses, could make the right choices. Thus they envisioned a gov-
ernment composed of what Thomas Jefferson later called the
"natural aristocracy": an aristocracy of merit and talent rather
than of birth.
Despite this fundamental difference in views on the purpose
of government, sometimes the liberals and the republicans could
agree on the structure of government. The best example of this is
the structure of the Senate. Madisonian liberals wanted the Sen-
ate chosen by the states rather than by the people, in order to
counteract the democratic and popular character of the House of
Representatives. This balance was part of the larger Madisonian
scheme of checks and balances. Wilsonian republicans, by con-
trast, wanted the Senate to be chosen by the states rather than by
the people because they thought that type of filtered or mediated
democracy was the best way to ensure a wise legislature.
Because of these fundamental differences, even where they
agreed in principle they had difficulty in practice. For example, in
15. Martin Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in The Moral
Foundations of the American Republic 75, 95 (Robert Horwitz ed. 1986).
16. Madison, supra note 1, at 286 (July 13).
[Vol. 6:43
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late June, they had already decided that the Senate terms would
rotate, with a third of the Senate up for election at a time. Having
decided that, they were trying to decide how long each Senator's
term should be. They had just about settled on seven years (with
one third elected at a time) when, according to Madison, "Mr. Wil-
liamson . .. suggest[ed] '6 years', as more convenient for Rotation
than 7 years."1 7 Without Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, we
would be having Senatorial elections every two and one-third
years.
They made other false starts as well. They ultimately wrote
a constitution based on three essential principles: dual sovereignty
of the state and national governments, separation and balance of
power within the national government, and some forni of popular
election of the government. There were times during the conven-
tion, however, when things might have turned out very differently.
Imagine what our government would have looked like today if any
of the following suggestions, all of which were offered and seri-
ously debated, had been adopted: that there should be more than
one President at a time;1 8 that the President be elected by the na-
tional legislature;' 9 that the Senate and the President be elected
for life;20 that Senators be paid no salary, because, according to
Charles Pinckney of North Carolina, "[a]s this branch was meant
to represent the wealth of the Country, it ought to be composed of
persons of wealth; and if no allowance was to be made the wealthy
alone would undertake the service." 21 I suppose it did turn out
that way, but not quite the way Pinckney envisioned it. Hamilton
suggested at one point that the national legislature should appoint
the state Governors. 22 Coming from a state that currently has a
Democratic Governor and two Republican Senators, I am sure you
can appreciate the impact that suggestion might have had.
Finally, David Brearley of New Jersey suggested "that a map
of the U.S. be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be
erased, and that a new partition of the whole be made into 13
equal parts."23  These are the mistakes that the drafters caught
early, the mistakes that they rectified in the final Constitution.
17. Id. at 192 (June 25).
18. See, e.g., id. at 46 (June 1), 58 (June 2), 59-60 (June 4).
19. See, e.g., id. at 150 (list of resolutions adopted by Convention as of June 19),
383 (list of resolutions adopted by Convention as of July 26 and sent to Committee
on Detail).
20. Id. at 135-36 (June 18).
21. Id. at 198 (June 26).
22. Id. at 139 (June 18).
23. Id. at 95 (June 9).
19881
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There is, however, another illustration of how they went wrong,
and that is to look at their predictions of the future.
In the course of framing a new government, they frequently
described their visions of the country and the government in the
future. Their predictions were not very accurate. Jonathon Day-
ton of New Jersey was, he said, persuaded that the Constitution
was "an amphibious monster" which "never would be rec[eived] by
the people."24 He was proven wrong all through 1788, when one
state after another ratified the Constitution. Roger Sherman of
Connecticut predicted that "the abolition of Slavery seemed to be
going on in the U.S. & . . . the good sense of the several States
would probably by degrees compleat it."25 Ellsworth similarly pre-
dicted "[a]s population increases poor laborers will be so plenty as
to render slaves useless. Slavery in time will not be a speck in our
Country."26  They too were proven wrong, with tragic
consequences.
James Wilson predicted that the Presidential veto power
would "seldom be used[; t]he Legislature would know that such a
power existed, and would refrain from such laws, as it would be
sure to defeat." 27 To date, the one hundredth Congress has
presented forty-seven substantive bills to the President and of
those forty-seven substantive bills the President has vetoed four.
That is a veto rate of slightly over eight percent, which is probably
not what Wilson meant by "seldom." Roger Sherman also had a
prediction about the Presidency. He said the people "will never
give a majority of votes to any one man[; t]hey will generally vote
for some man in their own State."28 That prediction, of course,
gets proven wrong every four years. In fact, once the twelfth
amendment sorted out the problem of determining which candi-
date was running for which executive office, only once has the
President failed to get a majority of electoral college votes, and
that was in 1824. Sherman was right when he said that the people
would generally vote for some man, but I don't believe that's what
he meant. Luther Martin of Maryland speculated on the judiciary,
suggesting that "a national Judiciary extended into the States
would be ineffectual .... 29
Finally, the framers did not have particularly great expecta-
tions about the durability of the Constitution. "Can it be sup-
24. Id. at 228 (June 30).
25. Id. at 503 (Aug. 22).
26. Id. at 504 (Aug. 22).
27. Id. at 63 (June 4).
28. Id. at 306 (July 17).
29. Id. at 160 (June 20).
[Vol. 6:43
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posed," Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts asked "that this vast
Country including the Western territory will 150 years hence re-
main one nation?"30 In the New York ratifying convention, Me-
lancton Smith made a similarly pessimistic prediction. "In three
or four hundred years," he said, "[the] population might amount to
a hundred millions: at this period, two or three great empires
might be established, totally different from our own." 31
I have just described a group of delegates who had fundamen-
tal disagreements over the most basic questions, who had little or
no idea what the government should look like and played with
strikingly different ideas, and who were shockingly wrong about
what the future would bring. They simply could not envision the
vast, diverse, egalitarian, commercially successful society that we
have today. So how can we explain their success? How could they
have been so wrong about so many issues that are central to the
structure of government, and still have created a constitution that
has lasted two hundred years despite these fundamental changes
in our society? The answer is that they did not create it: we did,
and we are still in the process of creating it.
The framers were wrong about a lot of things, but they were
right about what is perhaps the most basic point. They did write a
constitution for the ages, because they wrote an open-ended and
flexible document, leaving the construction and the interpretation
of it to future generations. In celebrating the bicentennial we
should keep in mind that it is both our right and our duty to con-
tinue interpreting the Constitution.
In order to do justice to our obligation to interpret the Con-
stitution, we must look to our own sense of justice and fairness, as
well as to our traditions; we cannot rely on what is frequently
called "the intent of the framers." For I hope that I have demon-
strated today that recourse to "the intent of the framers" on con-
temporary issues is both impossible-because those fifty-five men
in Philadelphia had conflicting views on virtually everything-and
a fundamental mistake, because the drafters of the Constitution
were not demigods, but ordinary men with limited abilities and
limited vision.
If we reject the notion that the Constitution is to be inter-
preted by recourse to the intent of the framers, however, we might
have another problem. The most frequent objection to the flexible
method of interpretation that I have just suggested is that it lacks
30. Id. at 410 (Aug. 8).
31. 2 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 382 (1891).
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legitimacy. Those who favor looking to "the intent of the framers"
argue that if judges interpret the Constitution without looking at
"original intent," then unelected judges are imposing their own
views and their own values against the will of the popularly
elected legislature. Judge Robert Bork took that position before
the Senate Judiciary Committee last year, and Attorney General
Edwin Meese has made the same argument.
I have already alluded to one difficulty with "original intent:"
it is very difficult, if not impossible, to identify "the intent of the
framers." Even if you can identify it, there are two responses to
the originalist argument. One response is simple, and one is more
complicated. The simple response is to ask why it is any more le-
gitimate or democratic to look to the interpretation of some
wealthy white men of two centuries ago than it is to look to fed-
eral judges who, although not elected, are at least appointed by an
elected President and an elected Senate.
The more complicated, and more interesting, response in-
volves a sort of a catch-22. If you do look at the intent of the fram-
ers (to the extent that it is recoverable), you will find that the
framers probably did not intend to limit judges to looking at the
framers' intent. That is why I call it a catch-22: looking at the
framers' intent tells us not to look at the framers' intent.
How do we know that the framers did not intend to limit
what judges could look at when interpreting the Constitution?
There are three pieces of evidence that we can look at: theories of
interpretation of various legal documents in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, the actual practice of interpreting
both state and federal constitutions during that period, and the
founding generation's notion of what they were creating when
they drafted or ratified or accepted the Constitution.
If one looks at how eighteenth century lawyers interpreted
various documents, including charters, wills, contracts, and the
like, one finds that they did not look at the intent of the parties or
authors of the document. They looked instead at a reasonable ob-
jective interpretation of the language under the circumstances. 32
The second way to recreate what the framers thought about
constitutional interpretation is to look at the early practice of con-
stitutional interpretation., A review of the earliest cases demon-
strates that the practice of interpreting the Constitution in ways
that deviate from and perhaps even conflict with the intent of the
framers is also a part of our constitutional heritage. Since the time
32. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985).
[Vol. 6:43
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of the first Chief Justice, John Jay, judges on all of our courts
have been using a variety of techniques-not simply the framers'
intent-to interpret the Constitution. In fact, until Madison's
notes of the debates in the Federal Convention were published in
1841, there was virtually no evidence of the intent of the framers.
In the earliest cases judges might perhaps have asked the drafters
what they meant, but apparently they did not do so. Instead, they
interpreted the document flexibly and in context. Chief Justice
John Marshall, who was perhaps the greatest Chief Justice, played
a significant role in establishing the legitimacy of this interpretive
technique. In 1819, in McCulloch v. Maryland,33 he said that "we
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." 34
He suggested it had to be flexibly and expansively interpreted lest
it become "a splendid bauble."35
One can consider this type of flexible and expansive constitu-
tional interpretation as itself part of "the intent of the framers."
The practice began as early as 1793, early enough to consider it as
evidence of the founding generation's intent. Moreover, many of
the first Supreme Court Justices were men who had been dele-
gates at the Federal Convention or at the state ratifying conven-
tions, including Ellsworth, Wilson, Rutledge, Paterson, and
Marshall. Thus at least some prominent eighteenth and early
nineteenth century Americans-whom we can label "framers"-
intended an open-ended interpretation not only of general legal
documents but of constitutions in particular.
The third reason to believe that the framers did not intend
for judges to be governed by the framers' intent is the most impor-
tant and the least familiar one. The founding generation simply
did not think of the Constitution in the same way that we do. We
think of the written Constitution as the sole source of fundamen-
tal law. One of the first things law students learn in a Constitu-
tional Law course is that a court can invalidate a legislative
enactment only if the legislation conflicts with the Constitution.
The founding generation didn't think that way. They viewed the
Constitution as only one small piece of a large body of fundamen-
tal law which included the Constitution, custom, tradition, natural
law and natural rights. For the men who wrote and ratified the
Constitution, all of those things-a written constitution as well as
such things as natural law-could be used by judges to invalidate
statutes. In other words, the founding generation expected judges
33. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
34. Id. at 421.
35. Id.
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to look outside the written Constitution in reviewing the validity
of statutes. They did not think they were reducing all of funda-
mental law to a single written document. Thus if we follow their
intent, judges should look not only outside the framers' intent, but
also outside the written Constitution itself.
Since I began by remarking that it is virtually impossible to
discover the framers' intent, let me give you some of the evidence
from which I draw the conclusion that the framers intended
judges to look beyond the Constitution. It is evidence that sug-
gests a perspective of Americans of that century, and thus is not
limited to those who attended the various conventions.
First, even before 1787, state courts were reviewing the valid-
ity of state statutes. In determining whether a state statute was
valid, both the lawyers' briefs and the courts' opinions cited, indis-
criminately, not only the state constitution or charter, but also the
"fundamental laws of England," the law of nations, Blackstone's
Commentaries, the Magna Carta, "general principles binding all
governments," "common right and reason," "inalienable rights,"
and "natural justice."3 6 This practice continued after 1787 as well,
even in the federal courts. The earliest Supreme Court opinions
considering the constitutionality of state and federal statutes relied
not only on the written Constitution, but also on "fundamental
principles," "vital principles [of] free republican governments,"
"the fundamental laws of every free government," "principles of
justice and policy," "the dictates of the moral sense," "right reason
and natural equity," "the reason and nature of things," "public
principles," "the common sense of mankind," "the maxims of eter-
nal justice," "the principles of civil right," and "natural justice."37
When the early Justices did cite the Constitution, they cited not
only the parts we are familiar with, but also the preamble, which
guarantees (among other things) the establishment of justice and
the "blessings of liberty." 38 If the modern Court has difficulty in-
terpreting such phrases as "due process of law" or "equal protec-
tion of the laws," imagine the problems of interpreting the
preamble.
There is also evidence from legislative debates that the
founding generation believed that natural rights existed beyond
those protected in the Constitution. In opposing the Bill of Rights,
many legislators and others argued that an enumeration of rights
36. See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi L.
Rev. 1127, 1134-46 (1987).
37. See id. at 1167-76.
38. See Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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would be dangerous because it would imply that only the enumer-
ated rights were protected.3 9 They argued that if some rights were
written into the Constitution, judges would conclude that those
listed rights were the only rights protected. This common eight-
eenth century argument presumes, of course, that there are other
rights out there, even where not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution. One member of the House of Representatives in
1789 ridiculed the idea that the Bill of Rights could possibly con-
tain all of the rights of citizens. If that was the case, he said, "the
drafting committee might have gone into a very lengthy enumera-
tion of rights; they might have declared that a man should have a
right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get up when he
pleased and go to bed when he thought proper."40 The House did
not find it necessary to protect those sorts of rights, which they be-
lieved would be protected regardless of whether they were put in
the Constitution. To pacify critics, and to guard against the feared
construction of a Bill of Rights, they added the ninth amendment:
"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
These cases and legislative examples range from 1780 to 1819.
They suggest that the founding generation did not intend to em-
body all of fundamental law in a single written document. Thus in-
validating statutes by looking to various sources and not just to the
written document or the intent of its authors is perfectly consis-
tent with the intent of the framers.
What does this conclusion mean today? It means when the
Court's critics ask where in the Constitution is there a right to pri-
vacy, one answer can be that judges are supposed to look outside
the Constitution. It means when the Court's critics ask how the
Constitution allows affirmative action programs designed to make
all members of our society full and productive members, one an-
swer can be that being an equal member of society is a natural ina-
lienable right, which does not need the explicit sanction of the
Constitution. And it means that our task as lawyers and scholars
and judges is not only to interpret the Constitution, not only to
point to specific phrases or particular Supreme Court cases, but
also to make reasoned and persuasive arguments about justice and
fairness and legitimacy. In other words, it means that we should
proceed on the assumption that some of our most important rights
are not found in the written words of the Constitution. Alexander
Hamilton expressed that very assumption in 1775: "The sacred
39. See Suzanna Sherry, supra note 36, at 1161-67 (1987).
40. 1 Annals of Cong. 732 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
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rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parch-
ments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam, in
the whole volume of human nature.... and can never be erased or
obscured . "..."41
41. Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, & C., in 1 The Papers of Alexan-
der Hamilton 81, 122 (Harold Syrett ed. 1961).
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